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Outlook 
and  
appraisal 
Overview 
 
 
 
The Scottish economy may be continuing to 
recover from recession but the rate of recovery 
appears to be slowing even when allowance is 
made for the difficult weather this winter. In the 
latest quarter – 2010q3 –  for which there is 
official data Scottish GDP grew by 0.5% 
compared to an increase of 0.7% in UK. But with 
UK GDP contracting by -0.6% in the fourth 
quarter and the ONS estimating that only -0.5% 
could be attributed to the bad weather, it is clear 
that the UK economy was stagnating at the end 
of the year. In the absence of Scottish outturn 
data for the fourth quarter, survey data indicate a 
weakening of Scottish growth in that quarter and 
suggests that Scottish GDP performance may 
have been weaker than the rest of the UK. The 
service sector is especially weaker in Scotland, 
the manufacturing sector less so, but 
construction activity is much stronger here, at 
least in the third quarter. 
 
There is a new puzzle in the labour market as 
unemployment  falls in Scotland while it 
continues to rise in the UK. Employment growth 
also appears to be stronger in Scotland. Yet, the 
growth of output, from the GVA/GDP data, 
suggests a weaker Scottish recovery than in the 
UK. One possible explanation is that the situation 
is the consequence of the Scottish job loss being 
proportionately much greater in the recession 
than in the UK despite a slightly smaller output 
loss. It may follow that as the recovery began UK 
firms on average had plenty of spare labour 
resource due to labour hoarding and so did not 
need to hire additional workers compared to their 
Scottish counterparts. So, for this reason, 
employment could be rising in Scotland while 
remaining static or falling, due to the weak 
recovery, in the UK. Other things equal, this 
would be associated with falling unemployment in 
Scotland and static or rising unemployment in 
UK.  A second possibility is due to the greater 
apparent shift to part-time working in Scotland, 
which opens up the possibility that while the 
number of jobs could be rising faster in Scotland 
than the UK, the provision of labour services may 
not be, and may be more in line with output 
change. Moreover, if to the end of 2010 the 
number of new part-time jobs offered was greater 
than the number of full time jobs lost then 
unemployment would fall and vary differently 
from the UK. 
 
Future economic conditions appear even more 
clouded by uncertainty than is usual. The most 
obvious example is the uncertainty surrounding 
the impact of the political upheaval in  the middle-
east  and Libya in particular.  The price of oil is 
rising and is now in the $110 to $120 range. 
Such high levels will continue as long as the 
Libyan crisis is unresolved and the extent to 
which Saudi Arabia acts as a 'swing' producer 
seeking to meet some or all of any shortfall 
following a  partial or complete shutdown of 
Libyan oil supply. Of course if the political 
upheaval spreads significantly to Saudi Arabia 
then the implications for the world economy will 
be enormous. Significant oil price hikes have in 
the past preceded a recession as in 2008 and 
occasionally are associated also with rising 
inflation as in the 1970s. 
 
Other uncertainties concern: 
 
 The growing threat of inflation, but core 
inflation especially earnings growth is 
largely stable. 
 Continuing weak bank lending as the 
banks continue to de-leverage, have 
significant amounts of debt to re-finance 
and face the prospect of further losses 
due to the risk of sovereign debt default 
especially, for British and Scottish banks, 
in Ireland. 
 The impact of fiscal consolidation. 
 Continuing weakness of household 
demand as households continuing to run 
down debt and as real household 
incomes are wealth fall. 
 Business investment and export growth, 
which are the hoped-for mainstay of 
recovery but both remain stubbornly 
weak. 
 
Against this background we are forecasting that 
GDP will grow by 1% this year, 1.6% in 2012 and 
1.9% in 2013. We have shaded down our 
forecasts for 2011 - by 0.1% points - and 2012 - 
by 0.3% points - compared to our November 
release. The lowering of the forecast is in part 
due to the worsening outlook for consumer 
confidence in both Scotland and the UK, while 
the much greater weakness relative to UK in 
2011, with UK forecasts around 2%, is very 
largely due to the stronger public spending cuts 
in Scotland this year. But while the recovery is 
weak, jobs are being created in the Scottish 
economy. Net jobs grow by 0.9% in 2010, 0.9% 
in 2011, 1.4% in 2012 and 1.7% in 2010. By 
2013 total employee jobs are forecast to be 
around 60,000 fewer than in 2007 and broadly 
the same as at the end of 2004. With the 
recovery in both output and employment 
comparatively weak, we predict the recovery this 
year will be insufficient to lower or even stabilise 
unemployment. Accordingly, unemployment is 
expected to rise in Scotland again during this 
year reaching 8.8%, or 234,000 by the end of the 
year. After that, though, the recovery should be 
sufficiently strong to make a more sustained dent 
in the rate and so we are forecasting lower rates 
of 8.4% and 7.9% in 2012 and 2013 respectively. 
 
In this Outlook & Appraisal we also look more 
closely at the growth issues confronting the 
Scottish economy over the longer term, beyond 
our forecasting horizon. This is done in the light 
of Scotland's past growth performance, shown to 
be a little weaker than the UK, identified 
problems, weaker productivity growth, and a 
failure to sustain and grow a vibrant export base. 
 
Recent GDP performance 
The Scottish economy continues to recover from recession 
to the latest data point in 2010q3. In the latest quarter – 
2010q3 – GDP grew by 0.5% compared to an increase of 
0.7% in UK - see Figure 1. Both the production (17% of total 
GVA) and service (74% of GVA) sectors were both weaker 
in Scotland than in the UK as a whole in the third quarter. 
Production GVA contracted by -0.3% in Scotland while 
increasing by 0.5% in the UK. Services grew slightly, by 
0.1%, in Scotland but grew by 0.5% in the UK. In contrast, 
construction (8% of GVA) grew more quickly in Scotland, at 
6.2%, compared to growth of the sector in the UK of 3.9%, 
and so made a considerable contribution to the overall 
growth of Scottish GVA in the quarter amounting to 0.5%. 
The agriculture, forestry and fishing sector (2% of GVA) also 
grew more quickly here, with growth of 1.3% in the quarter, 
while the sector in the UK contracted by -0.3%. 
 
Despite stronger Scottish growth in the previous quarter, 
2010q2, of 1.3% compared to UK growth of 1.0%, the 
recovery is weaker in Scotland. Scottish GDP has grown by 
1.9% from the trough of the recession while UK GDP has 
recovered by 2.7%. In consequence, Scottish GDP is still -
3.9% below pre-recession peak whereas UK GDP is -3.8% 
below and it should be remembered that the recession was 
greater in UK (-6.3% fall in GDP) than in Scotland (-5.7%). 
 
The service sector (74% of Scottish GDP) grew by 0.1% in 
2010q3 compared to growth in UK services of 0.5%, see 
Figure 2. The weakness in the Scottish service sector is 
Figure 1:  Scottish and UK quarterly GDP growth, 1998q2 to 2010q3 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Scottish and UK Services GVA growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2010q3 
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Figure 3:  Scottish and UK manufacturing GVA growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2010q3 
 
 
 
Figure 4:  Scottish and UK construction GVA volume growth 1998q2-2010q3 
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clearly a cause for concern. The sector has hardly begun to 
recover from recession with growth of 0.7%, while UK 
services has grown by 2.2% from its recession trough. In 
consequence, Scottish service sector GVA is -3.8% below 
its pre-recession peak whereas UK  services GVA is -2.4% 
below. 
 
In 3rd quarter 2010 Manufacturing GVA rose by 0.7% in 
Scotland against a rise of 1.1% in manufacturing in the UK. 
Figure 3 makes clear that there has been much variability in 
the recent performance of the sector and recovery from its 
recession trough has been slower here, with growth from 
the bottom of recession of 3.6% compared to UK 
manufacturing which has recovered by 5.2%. It is also worth 
noting that the recession in manufacturing was much 
greater in the UK with output falling by -14.6% whereas 
Scottish manufacturing output fell by -11.1%. 
 
Both Scottish and UK construction GVA are recovering 
strongly, with growth averaging more than 5% per quarter in 
Scotland over last the three quarters and 3.5% in UK, see 
Figure 4.  Construction is the only principal sector in 
Scotland to have grown past its pre-recession peak with 
GVA 1.8% above  the peak in Scotland but still -4.6% below 
peak in UK, at 2010q3. 
 
At the sub principal sector level, the main service sectors 
contributing to growth were retail & wholesale, other 
services, transport, storage & communication and the public 
sector. Retail & wholesale grew by 0.7% in the third quarter, 
which was slightly weaker than the growth of 0.9% in the 
sector in the UK. Transport, storage & communication grew 
by 0.4%, which was much slower than the 2% growth 
achieved by its UK counterpart. Other services grew 
strongly by 1.9%, somewhat faster than the 1.2% achieved 
by other services in the UK. Finally, growth in public sector 
GVA was weaker in Scotland during the quarter than in the 
UK with output rising by 0.1% compared to 0.5% in the UK. 
Both hotels & catering and financial services contracted in 
the third quarter with GVA falling by -0.2% in the former 
compared to a rise of 0.8% in hotels & catering in the UK. 
Financial services suffered a sharp contraction with GVA 
falling by -1.5% while the financial sector in the UK grew by 
0.2% - see Figure 5. These data suggest that the effects of 
the credit crunch and recession are still being felt in the 
sector. 
 
Figure 5:  Scottish and UK financial services GVA growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 2010q3 
 
 
In manufacturing, the main sectoral drivers of growth were 
the chemicals & man-made fibre, food & drink, and paper, 
printing & publishing industries. Chemicals grew strongly by 
3.7% in the quarter, double the growth rate of the sector in 
the UK which grew by 1.8%. Of course, chemicals suffered 
very badly in the recession and now appears to be 
recovering strongly. Paper, printing & publishing also grew 
by 3.7% in the quarter, while output in the sector in the UK 
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-4.6%. Finally, the engineering sector grew weakly and at 
the same rate, 0.2%, during the quarter in the UK. The 
electronics sector after recovering strongly in the second 
quarter slipped back somewhat in the third quarter with GVA 
falling by -0.3% in Scotland while rising by 2% in the UK. 
Transport equipment GVA fell in both Scotland and the UK, 
by -0.2% and -4% respectively. But mechanical engineering 
did display positive growth in the quarter with the Scottish 
sector growing by 1.4%, quite a bit less than the growth of 
3.3% in UK mechanical engineering. 
 
Recent labour market performance 
In the previous Commentary, we sought to explain the 
apparent puzzle over the recession of Scottish 
unemployment rising more quickly than the UK, and so 
rising above the UK, at a time of comparable GDP change. 
 
 We explained this as follows. 
 
 First, a comparable GDP fall, other things equal, might 
have been expected to push up the Scottish unemployment 
rate by more than the UK for simple arithmetic reasons 
since the Scottish rate was initially appreciably below the 
UK rate.  
 
Secondly, unemployment rose more quickly than the UK 
after 2009Q2 because inactivity rose more quickly in the 
UK.  
 
Thirdly, there was significant measured job loss in Scotland 
in 2010Q1. Inactivity rose strongly in Scotland dampening 
the rise in unemployment but suggesting that Scottish 
unemployment may continue to rise relative to the UK if 
some or all of the increased numbers of inactive workers 
decide to return to the labour market.  
 
Finally, we noted the possibility that measurement error 
between periods might be clouding the outcome. Taking the 
recession period as a whole, by 2010q1 the contraction in 
Scottish jobs was, at -4.47%, a lot greater than the UK 
contraction of    -2.54%. Total Scottish employment had 
fallen by -114,000, Scottish unemployment had risen by 
112,000 and Scottish and UK inactivity had moved to 
comparable levels.  
 
Now we appear to be faced with a new puzzle.  
 
The new puzzle is that unemployment is falling in Scotland 
while it continues to rise in the UK. And, employment growth 
also appears to be stronger in Scotland. Yet, the growth of 
output, from the GVA/GDP data, suggests a weaker 
Scottish recovery than in the UK. 
 
We can only speculate as to the reasons for this apparent 
discrepancy. There are several possibilities. 
 
First, we have noted that the Scottish job loss was 
proportionately much greater in the recession than in the UK 
despite a slightly smaller output loss. It may follow that as 
the recovery began UK firms on average had plenty of spare 
labour resource due to labour hoarding and so did not need 
to hire additional workers compared to their Scottish 
counterparts who having shed proportionately more workers 
were hoarding much less labour. So, for this reason, 
employment could be rising in Scotland while remaining 
static or falling, due to the weak recovery, in the UK. Other 
things equal, this would be associated with falling 
unemployment in Scotland and static or rising 
unemployment in UK. It is also compatible with rising 
activity/falling inactivity in Scotland and falling activity/ rising 
inactivity in the UK, providing that the change in 
activity/inactivity is due to the change in employment. 
 
A second possible explanation may be due to differential 
changes in the balance of part-time and full-time 
employment between Scotland and the UK. The Overview 
of the labour market below notes that over the year to June 
2010 there was a decline in the number of full time workers 
by -4.1% and a rise in the number of part-time workers by 
3.9%. It appears that the shift to part-time workers is greater 
in Scotland than the UK. If so, this opens up the possibility 
that while the number of jobs could be rising faster in 
Scotland than the UK, the provision of labour services may 
not be, and may be more in line with output change. 
Moreover, if to the end of 2010 the number of new part-time 
jobs offered was greater than the number of full time jobs 
lost then unemployment would fall and vary differently from 
the UK. 
 
We favour the first explanation but do not rule out the 
possibility that variations in the balance of full time to part-
time work may in part contribute to the puzzle. What can be 
said though is that the relatively strong output bounce-back 
in the first two quarters of recovery is unlikely to be 
sustained. If the subsequent recovery of output is weak and 
remains below trend then there is a strong likelihood that 
unemployment in Scotland will begin to rise again. 
 
Scottish Growth: past, present and future 
As the Scottish economy pulls slowly out of recession, with 
its banks badly shaken, financial service, housing and 
property market activity curtailed and the public sector set 
for contraction, it is reasonable to consider the prospects for 
future growth beyond the three-year focus of the latest 
forecast projections presented below. We do this by 
examining Scotland's growth performance over the last 46 
years to get some sense of the nature of the problems and 
what needs to be addressed. 
 
What are the stylised facts about Scotland's growth? 
First, and perhaps surprisingly for some, the growth of GDP 
has on average been little different from UK GDP growth. 
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate. 
 
Figure 6 shows that annual average growth of GVA/GDP 
was 2% in Scotland and 2.2% in the UK between 1963 and 
1999. This is a small difference. At Scottish average growth, 
the level of GDP should have doubled by 1998 - 35 years - 
Figure 6:  UK and Scottish GVA per head growth 1963-2009, by sub period, percent per annum 
 
 
 
 
whereas at UK average growth, UK GDP should have 
doubled by 1995 - 32 years. Figure 6 also indicates that the 
growth rates have varied over the period. The Scottish 
economy enjoyed strong absolute and relative growth in the 
1960s due mainly to the impact of regional policy on inward 
and domestic investment, the growth of financial services 
and the development of North Sea oil. In no other period 
was Scottish growth stronger than the UK. It is clear that 
growth in both the Scottish and UK economies has been 
affected by wider global influences such as the oil price 
hikes and stagflation in the 1970s. It is also clear that 
Scottish growth strengthened over the 1990s and 2000s 
until the most recent recession but with growth still slower 
than the UK. In the post devolution period Scottish growth 
was a strong as it had been since the 1960s and broadly the 
same as the UK. Of course, this is not to attribute the 
outcome to devolution, one cannot be certain, especially 
since there was a boom in the UK economy prior to the 
credit crunch and recession at the end of the decade. We 
look at the sectoral composition of growth in this period 
below. But it is worth noting that the Scottish growth 
performance during this period was quite remarkable given 
the loss of around 50% of the output of the electronics 
industry in Scotland following the worldwide recession in the 
ICT industries, which began to hit Scottish electronics output 
from the third quarter of 2000. 
 
In Figure 7 we display the growth of GVA/GDP per head in 
Scotland and the UK over the same time periods. GDP per 
head is generally considered by economists to provide a 
better indication of prosperity than GDP alone because it 
allows for population size. 
 
The weaker growth of Scotland's population results in the 
growth of GDP per head in Scotland being slightly larger 
than the growth of GDP per head in the UK. The average 
growth rates are essentially the same but Scotland is just 
ahead with an average rate of 2% per annum compared to 
1.9% in the UK over the 46 year period. The relative 
strengthening of Scotland's growth during the 1990s and 
2000s is also evident with growth now comparable to the UK 
in the 1990s and slightly above the UK between 1999 and 
2007. And as with GDP in the recent recession the drop in 
Scottish GDP and GDP per head was less than in the UK. 
The stronger growth of GDP/GVA per head in Scotland in 
the 2000s is probably one reason why Scotland's 
unemployment rate fell below the UK. We noted in the 
previous Commentary that estimates of Okun's relationship 
suggest that a GDP growth rate of around 2% per annum is 
necessary to stabilise both the UK and Scotland's 
unemployment rate. Further work on this relationship is 
reported in the main Forecasts of the Scottish economy 
section below. Clearly, with a GDP growth rate of 2.6% and 
GDP per head growth rate of 2.4% the unemployment rate 
in Scotland would have been expected to fall. 
 
So what were the main industrial drivers of Scotland's GDP 
growth? 
 
We do not have consistent data for the past 46 years and so 
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Figure 7:  UK and Scottish GVA per head growth 1963-2009  
 
 
 
Figure 8:  Industry shares in UK and Scottish growth:  1981q1 to 20089 
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must rely on more recent data from 1998. Figure 8 charts 
the industry shares in Scottish and UK GDP growth between 
1998Q1 and 2008Q1, the latter being peak output before 
the economy went into recession. 
 
The figure highlights the importance of real estate and 
business services (REBS) to growth in both Scotland and 
the UK. About half of this sector is property and housing 
market related, so some of this growth clearly reflects the 
boom in property and housing markets in the 2000s. But the 
contribution of this sector to growth was somewhat stronger 
in the UK than in Scotland with a contribution of almost 39% 
in the UK and just above 35% in Scotland. Financial 
services was the second most important sectoral driver of 
growth and was a little more important in Scotland, with a 
contribution of almost 18% to Scotland's growth whereas the 
sector's contribution to UK growth was just above 16%. 
Retail & wholesale was the third most important sectoral 
contributor to growth in both Scotland and the UK. But it was 
significantly more important in Scotland accounting for just 
over 16% of overall growth compared to a contribution of 
less than 13% in the UK. This probably just as much 
represents structural changes on the supply-side of retailing 
in Scotland, with the main multiples raising their relative 
presence in Scotland towards UK levels, as to any 
differences in household demand for retail products 
between Scotland and the UK. Transport  services was the 
fourth most important sector to growth in both Scotland and 
UK with the contribution much the same to both at just 
above 12% here and just below 13% in the UK. With similar 
contributions to UK and Scottish growth of just above 11% 
and below 12%, respectively, the public sector was much 
less important to growth than has often been suggested and 
no more important in Scotland than in the UK. Finally, the 
construction sector in Scotland contributed more to growth 
than its UK counterpart accounting for more than a 7% 
share whereas in the UK the contribution was less than 5%. 
 
The negative contribution of manufacturing to Scottish 
growth compares to the small positive contribution made by 
the sector in the UK. There is no doubt that the contraction 
from 2000 of the electronics industry, disproportionately 
located in Scotland, contributed to this outcome but it does 
raise questions about the sector's contribution to future 
growth. 
 
A question not answered by the previous discussion is the 
extent to which differences in the contribution of sectors to 
Scottish and UK growth reflects variation in the relative 
importance of the sectors to the Scottish and UK 
economies, or whether the same sectors have performed 
differently. Figure 9 helps us answer this question, for the 
same period to 2008 before the start of the recession. 
 
Figure 9 reveals that over the period from 1998 to 2008 
quarterly growth in Scotland averaged 91% of UK growth. 
However, if we apply the UK industrial structure weighting to 
the actual Scottish sectoral growth rates there is some 
improvement in Scottish growth to 95% of the UK average. 
But by applying the UK growth rates of each sector to the 
Scottish industrial structure, Scotland's growth performance 
rises to 98% of the UK average. What this simple analysis 
suggests is that if Scotland could move closer to the UK 
industrial structure it would get a growth dividend, because 
Scotland is somewhat less specialised in fast growing 
sectors such as business services & real estate, retail & 
wholesale and transport & communication. But more 
significantly, the figure indicates that if Scottish industry had 
grown at the same rates as its UK counterparts then 
Scottish growth would have risen to 98% of the average 
quarterly rate. In other words, the performance of Scottish 
industry has been generally weaker and that suggests an 
intrinsic competitiveness problem.
1 
 
This analysis mirrors that of the Scottish Council of 
Economic Advisers (SCEA) who found in their 2009 report 
that improved labour force utilisation had made a bigger 
contribution to Scottish GDP growth between 1997 and 
2007 than labour productivity growth, when compared to the 
UK.
2 
   Moreover, the SCEA also found that Scottish labour 
productivity was 3 percent lower than the UK average, while 
wages were 6 percent lower (using 2004-06 data). This 
implies that average labour costs per unit of output were 
about 3 percent lower in Scotland. But the Scottish economy 
was not more competitive over 1997-2007 than the rest of 
the UK otherwise growth should have been faster here.
3
 
What this analysis suggests is that capital, and therefore 
total factor, productivity must be lower in Scotland by an 
amount sufficient to more than offset the advantage from 
lower average unit labour costs. 
 
We suggest that lower total factor productivity and 
competitiveness may be due to key weaknesses of the 
Scottish economy, which are likely to limit the future growth 
of productivity, exports and the output of the Scottish 
economy. 
 
There is developing evidence-based consensus that the 
promotion of growth in small open economies requires focus 
on: 
 
 growing the export base by developing companies 
of scale and attracting inward investment; 
 enhancing competitiveness of the export base 
through innovation, R&D and improved business 
sophistication, including promoting leadership and 
enterprise; 
 raising economy-wide value added by encouraging 
new and small firms to link into the supply-chains 
of the export base.
4
 
 
Export Base 
Scotland's export base is in decline. The recent Economy, 
Energy and Tourism Committee's "Report on the public 
sector's support for exporters, international trade and the 
attraction of inward investment"
5 
 noted the decline over the 
past 10 years. This is indicated by a fall in the volume of 
Figure 9:  Shift-share analysis of Scottish growth:  1998q1-2008q1 
 
 
 
manufactured exports abroad following the contraction of 
the electronics sector which began in 2000, and a fall in the 
share of the value of UK goods exports from 9% in 2001 to 
6% in 2007, the year before the recession commenced. 
During the recession the share rose to 7% in 2009. The 
Committee Report notes that " ..... almost all other nations 
and regions have – over the same period – seen the value 
of their exports rise during the same period." Data presented 
to the Committee by Scottish Development International 
(SDI) indicate only 5% of all UK exporting companies are 
based in Scotland.
6 
  The Committee notes that "this 
compares poorly to the fact that around 8% of all VAT 
registered firms in the UK are located in Scotland." 
 
Scotland's export base is also narrowly focused. The 
Scottish Enterprise paper on exporting and economic 
growth notes the following: "The top five overseas exporting 
industries in 2008 were chemicals (including refined 
petroleum products) (£3.5billion), food & beverages 
(£3.4bn), business services (£2.3bn), the wholesale, retail & 
accommodation sector (£1.4bn) and manufacture machinery 
and equipment (£1.4bn). Together these industries 
accounted for well over half of total exports from Scotland." 
(page 7). Moreover, the paper also notes that exports are 
concentrated amongst few companies, with "  the largest 60 
exporting companies account(ing) for 50% of Scotland's 
exports with the top 400 companies accounting for 80% of 
exports.  This concentration highlights a risk of sudden 
structural change having a significant impact on export 
performance.  An example of this is with the electronics 
industry since 2000." (page 6). In addition, Scotland's main 
export markets: the US, Netherlands, France, Germany and 
Belgium, are not the main growth markets, which are in Asia 
such as China and India - see discussion of Scottish exports 
in Forecasts of the Scottish economy section below. 
Scottish exporters will need to diversify considerably if they 
are to benefit significantly from the main sources of future 
global growth. 
 
The Scottish Parliament Committee also provides evidence 
of Scotland's declining share of inward investment attracted 
to the UK, which is so crucial to building and maintaining the 
export base. It is true, as the Committee notes, that 
Scotland remains the second most attractive destination for 
inward investment in the UK, after the South East of 
England. But the number of new projects attracted to 
Scotland between 2000 and 2009 fell, while eight out of the 
other ten countries or regions across the UK witnessed net 
growth. There is a contrary view that the number and scale 
of projects is less important than their value and increasingly 
SDI has been concentrating on attracting fewer projects of 
higher value. While such projects may add more value to 
the economy and leverage more growth than lower value 
projects, if the scale of the export base is declining then this 
is most quickly addressed by attracting more inward 
investment projects to Scotland. Such projects inevitably 
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Figure 10:  Industry shares in recession output loss:  2008q2 to 2010q2 
 
 
 
have a high export orientation much higher than the 
domestically owned average. 
 
A final point to note is that the recession may have served to 
erode Scotland's export base. Figure 10 charts the share 
across industries of the average quarterly loss of output 
during the recession. The loss of output during the 
recession was largely concentrated in three sectors, which 
accounted for 78% of the output loss in Scotland: real estate 
& business services (REBS) (37%), manufacturing (23%), 
and finance (17%). This was less so in the UK where the 
output loss in these sectors accounted for only 51% of the 
overall loss, although manufacturing contributed more to the 
output loss (30%) in the UK than it did in Scotland. With 
losses of such scale in REBS, manufacturing and financial 
services there is a real risk that some of that capacity may 
not be replaced. Financial services is a key exporter from 
Scotland to other parts of the UK  - see discussion of 
Scottish exports in Forecasts of the Scottish economy 
section below - and it seems likely that the restructuring of 
the banking industry after the credit crunch and recession 
could diminish the significance of that role. The same 
situation may apply in manufacturing, the principal source of 
goods exports.  With a loss in manufacturing output of 
nearly one quarter there is the risk that some of the capacity 
used to produce that output will disappear from Scotland so 
eroding the export base. 
 
 
Drivers of productivity and competitiveness 
The evidence suggests that small open economies can best 
enhance competitiveness of their export base through 
innovation, R&D and improved business sophistication, 
including promoting leadership and enterprise. This is a big 
challenge for the Scottish economy, the government and its 
enterprise agencies because of the following weaknesses: 
 
 Very low business R&D (0.46% of GDP, 3.2% of 
UK BERD) and weak innovation. 
 
 Weak entrepreneurship, especially new firm 
formation. (GEM 2009: Scotland's rate of total early 
stage entrepreneurial activity among lowest in 20 
developed countries). 
 
 Lack companies of scale and anchor institutions
7
. 
 
 Skill impacts of ageing and declining population
8
. 
 
 Lack of competition in transport, utilities, catering, 
leisure and business banking
9
. 
 
 Public services in Scotland are less efficient: 
monopolistic, top-down and target driven (Crafts, 
2005)
10
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Scotland's poor position, relative to OECD countries and 
other small nations, on some of these drivers of 
competitiveness is shown clearly in Table 1 recently 
published by Scottish Enterprise: 
 
But we should not ignore the Scottish economy's strengths 
in some drivers of competitiveness that can help build a 
competitive export base: 
 
 Graduates account for slightly more than 20% of 
the working age population placing Scotland ahead 
of most UK regions apart from London and the 
South East. 
 
 The science base represented by the research 
strengths of Scotland's universities is a major asset 
for growth, which has yet to be fully exploited. 
 
 Scotland has high levels of social capital -" features 
of social life – networks, norms, and trust – that 
enable participants to act together more effectively 
to pursue shared objectives" reinforced by mature 
institutions. "Social capital increases productivity by 
reducing transaction costs and disseminating 
technical and organizational knowledge."
11 
 
Evidence is accumulating that 'social capital' has a 
role to play in growth.
12
 
 
 Scotland also is perceived as having high levels of 
amenity with, for example, Edinburgh frequently 
ranked high in surveys as a ‘good place to live and 
work’.
13 
 
Small firms 
It is easy to underestimate the potential role of small firms in 
economic development. However, small firms are less likely 
to export than larger firms. Scottish Enterprise cite a recent 
UK government study
14
 which demonstrates that exporting 
increases with firm size. The survey found that 46.1% of 
firms with at least 250 employees were exporters compared 
to 32.9% of those with 10-49 employees. The propensity to 
export also rises if establishments are part of a multi-region, 
multi-plant firm operating in more than one industry, or if the 
establishment is foreign owned. While policy efforts to assist 
SMEs to export should be encouraged it may also make 
sense for policy to recognise the lower export propensity of 
SMEs and seek in addition to encourage and assist them to 
seek to supply the key 400 firms in the Scottish export base. 
Any success here would not raise the volume of exports but 
would raise the value added to the economy of exports. 
 
Key conclusions on Scottish growth and 
prospects 
 Scottish growth over almost 50 years is 
comparable to UK growth – a little lower in 
absolute terms – but middling by international 
standards. Trend growth in GDP per head is 
slightly higher in Scotland but largely due to 
weaker population growth. 
 Yet, mature economies tend to display similar trend 
growth close to 2%
15
. Although, small open 
economies have scope for faster growth and 
decline due to significance of resource mobility e.g. 
capital and labour, into and out of the economy
16
. 
 
 Until the recent recession, the most important 
sectors for Scottish growth were real estate & 
business services, financial services, retailing & 
wholesaling, and transport & communication, much 
the same as in the UK. 
 
 Ranking fifth in importance the public sector was 
much less important to growth than has often been 
suggested and no more important in Scotland than 
in the UK. 
 
 The analysis suggests is that if Scotland could 
move closer to the UK industrial structure it would 
get a growth dividend, because Scotland is 
somewhat less specialised in fast growing sectors 
such as business services & real estate, retail & 
wholesale and transport & communication.  
 
 But the analysis also suggests that the 
performance of Scottish industry has been 
generally weaker than UK industrial counterparts 
and that suggests an intrinsic competitiveness 
problem. 
 
 This is supported by evidence that Scottish labour 
productivity growth is weaker than UK. But unit 
labour costs are, on average, about 3% lower here, 
which suggests that we have a problem of lower 
total factor productivity: it is not simply low 
investment and low capital per worker that is the 
problem. 
 
 Scotland's export base is narrowly focused, is 
declining, and may have been eroded further in the 
recession.  
 
 To raise Scotland's growth rate there is a need to 
grow the export base by developing companies of 
scale and attracting inward investment, and 
enhancing its competitiveness through innovation, 
R&D and improved business sophistication, 
including promoting leadership and enterprise. 
 
 Scotland's strong university research base, 
technological and sectoral know-how, graduate 
supply, high social capital and amenity, are 
strengths that offer a basis for future growth in key 
sectors. 
 
 Small firms have a low export propensity but policy 
can raise economy-wide value added both by 
seeking raise the exports of SMEs and by 
Table 1: Current OECD quartile rankings overview for Scotland, Arc of 
Prosperity Countries and other small EU countries    
        
Indicator Year  Scotland  Austria  Denmark  Finland  Iceland  Ireland  Lux Norway  Portugal  Sweden  
Ave GDP 
growth  1998 -2008 3 3 4 2 1 1 1 3 4 2 
GDP per head 
2008 3 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 4 1 
Employment 
rate (15-64 yr 
olds) 
2008 2 2 1 2 1 3 3 1 3 1 
Productivity 
2008 3 2 2 2 3 1 1 1 4 2 
Entrepreneurial 
activity 2007 -2009 4 - 3 2 1 2 - 1 - - 
Total R&D as % 
GDP 2008 3 
1 1 1 2 3 3 3 3 1 
Business R&D 
as % total R&D 2008 4 1 2 1 3 2 1 3 4 1 
Business R&D 
as % GDP  2008 
4 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 3 1 
Graduates as % 
of the pop. 
(aged 25-64) 
2008 2 4 1 3 1 2 3 1 4 2 
Population 
growth (1999-
2008) 
1999 -2008 4 3 3 4 1 1 1 2 3 3 
Net migration 
as % of the 
population 
2008 2 2 2 3 3 1 1 1 3 2 
Export sales 
growth -3 yr 
annual ave 
2006 - 2008 4 2 3 1 2 3 1 4 2 3 
Source: Scottish Enterprise "Economic Performance Indicators(November 2010 Update)" 
 encouraging new and small firms to seek to link 
into the supply-chains of the key 400 firms in the 
Scottish export base. 
 
Forecasts 
Data on GDP growth for the fourth quarter 2010 for Scotland 
will not be available until April. To assess the fourth quarter 
performance we have the UK outturn data for GDP and 
survey information. The UK GDP data showed initially  
a  -0.5% fall in GDP and this has today been revised further 
downwards to -0.6%. The ONS continue to attribute 0.5% of 
the fall wholly to the bad weather in December. So this 
suggests that UK growth was stagnant in Q4, indeed falling 
slightly,  after the 'strong' recovery evident in the data for the 
second and third quarters of 1.1% and 0.7% respectively.  
The fourth quarter UK GDP data may be revised upwards 
because they are based on only partial information for the 
quarter but the data imply that the UK recovery from 
recession is clearly slowing down. This of course was to be 
expected to some degree since the stronger growth in the 
earlier part of 2010 represented a form of 'bounce back' as  
companies sought to rebuild stocks to more acceptable 
levels and as postponed construction projects were 
restarted and completed.  
 
Nevertheless, the manufacturing sector in the UK continues 
to display steady and improving growth at 1.1% in the 
quarter, even though the figure was revised down by 0.3% 
points. This is the counterpart of the strengthening growth in 
export volumes, which rose by 2.3% in Q4 and 1.7% in Q3. 
But note the growth of imports was 3% so the net 
contribution of trade to growth was negative.  Despite the 
rise in imports household consumption fell by 0.1% in Q4, 
which may be weather affected and there was no obvious 
sign of a pick-up in demand to beat the VAT rise in January. 
Nevertheless, the relatively flat growth of household 
demand is in line with expectations as households continue 
to adjust their household balance sheets and debt position. 
But investment volumes - gross fixed capital formation - also 
contracted in Q4 and fell markedly by -2.5% compared to a  
rise of 3.7% in Q3. This is a cause for concern since most 
forecasters, including the OBR, are assuming that it will be 
the growth in investment and exports that will be the main 
drivers of recovery.  
 
It seems reasonable to assume that Scottish GDP growth 
will be similar to the UK in the fourth quarter. Indeed, there 
is a risk that the outturn could be worse here than the UK 
because it is arguable that the weather was worse here in 
December and there is evidence that the Scottish recovery 
is slowing and is weaker than rest of UK - see Review of 
Scottish Business Surveys  section below. That section also 
notes the difficulty in disentangling short-term from long-
term influences on future Scottish growth. While weather 
effects can clearly be assigned to the short-term category it 
is more difficult with other issues currently confronting the 
economy. The most obvious example is the impact of the 
political upheaval in  the middle-east  and Libya in particular.  
The price of oil is rising and is now in the $110 to $120. 
Such high levels will continue as long as the Libyan crisis is 
unresolved and the extent to which Saudi Arabia acts as a 
'swing' producer seeking to meet some or all of any shortfall 
following partial or complete shut down of Libyan oil supply. 
Of course if the political upheaval spread significantly to 
Saudi Arabia then the implications for the world economy 
will be enormous. Significant oil price hikes have in the past 
preceded a recession as in 2008 and occasionally are 
associated also with rising inflation as in the 1970s. Which 
takes us to the first major uncertainty affecting the future 
growth of the Scottish and UK economies: 
 
 Growing threat of inflation 
The CPI is currently at 4%  driven by rising prices 
of food, commodities – oil –  and the VAT rise. The 
Bank of England View is that inflation will continue 
to rise through the year to nearly 5% but then the 
effect of these temporary drivers of inflation will 
subside and inflation will move back down. The 
MPC appears to be split on the issue with at least 3 
members now fearing that a rising CPI is feeding 
into inflationary expectations. Real incomes are  
falling as the CPI outstrips earnings growth and 
this may lead to a potential wage-price spiral. But 
for that to occur, the labour market needs to be 
tighter than it is currently, with earnings - a key 
ingredient of core inflation -  rising by less than 2%. 
The tightness of the labour market is a reflection of 
the output gap in the economy and estimates differ 
as to its size. The larger the output gap the less 
likely will inflationary expectations transfer into core 
inflation pressures. But the IFS in its recent Green 
Budget is more pessimistic about the size of the 
output gap than the OBR, putting it close to 2% of 
potential output in 2010Q3 compared to an 
estimate of 3% by the OBR. Further, there is some  
evidence of core inflation starting to rise when 
housing costs are included in the measure. So, 
while we support the Bank's view that the 
inflationary push is temporary there must be some 
concern that this will begin to translate into more 
sustained price rises, and so we can expect the 
MPC to start to slowly raise base rates before the 
middle of the year. 
 
Other issues and 'known unknowns' affecting the recovery 
are 
 Financial-based recessions have a slow  recovery 
 
 Banks continue to de-leverage to improve 
balance sheets, so lending at reduced 
availability and higher price. 
 
 Significant debt re-financing in prospect, 
both may hamper the bank's ability to 
finance a strong recovery. 
 
 Sovereign debt problems in the EURO area
Table 2: Forecast Scottish GVA Growth in Three Scenarios, 2010-2013  
 
GVA Growth (% per annum) 2010 2011 2012 2013 
   
High growth 1.1 2.1 2.4 2.6 
November forecast 1.3 2.1 2.4 n.a. 
Central 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.9 
November forecast 1.0 1.1 1.9 n.a. 
Low growth 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.9 
November forecast 0.5 0.3 1.0 n.a. 
 
 
 Sovereign debt defaults and or ‘haircuts’ 
for creditors will damage Scottish, British 
and Euro banks, their lending and hence 
their ability to finance the recovery. 
 
 Impact of fiscal consolidation 
 
 Net reduction of demand in economy via 
spending cuts and tax rises 
 
 While resources will be freed up, fiscal 
consolidation will not, of itself, generate 
offsetting private sector growth. 
 
 Household demand growth is weak: 
 
 Households appear to be continuing to run 
down debt - de-leveraging. 
 
 Real household incomes are falling as 
inflation runs ahead of wage and earnings 
growth. 
 
 House prices are on downward trend and 
falling more rapidly in Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and the North of England 
 
 Business investment and export growth are the 
hoped-for mainstay of recovery but  
 
 the former is weak in UK and probably 
Scotland and  
 
 the latter may be affected by currency 
‘wars’ between China and US, which may 
threaten the growth of world trade. 
 
It is against this background that we have prepared our 
forecasts, which are fully discussed in Forecasts of the 
Scottish Economy below. Only the main points are 
presented here. 
 
GVA Forecasts 
Table 2 presents our forecasts for Scottish GVA - GDP at 
basic prices - for 2010 to 2013. As before we present a 
central forecast, which we hold to be most probable and 
high growth and low growth forecasts which define the 
range of outcomes in which Scottish growth is likely to fall. 
In the subsequent discussion we concentrate mainly on the 
central forecast. 
 
Clearly, since we do not yet - until April - have the 2010Q4 
Scottish GDP data, we still have to forecast the outturn for 
2010.  Positive growth continues to be forecast in all years 
and on all 3 scenarios. GVA growth of 1% in 2010 is the 
same as our November forecast. This remains below the 
OBR and consensus forecasts for the UK in 2010, which 
largely reflects the weaker growth of household spending in 
Scotland. This year, we are forecasting growth of 1%, a little 
less than our November forecast. The lowering of the 
forecast is in part due to the worsening outlook for 
consumer confidence in both Scotland and the UK, while the 
greater weakness relative to UK, with UK forecasts around 
2% for 2011, is very largely due to the stronger public 
spending cuts in Scotland this year - noted in the previous 
Commentary. Household spending in 2011 is squeezed by 
the VAT rise and falling real household  incomes. In 2012, 
our forecast of 1.6% growth is again lower than November's 
forecast of 1.9%. While production and manufacturing 
output is starting to pick up reasonably strongly, growing at 
4% for production in 2012, the service sector displays 
insipid growth of 1.2% as household demand remains weak. 
Construction also exhibits weak growth of 1% in 2012, 
reflecting cut backs in government capital spending and 
weak private sector investment. Finally, our new forecast for 
2013 predicts growth of 1.9%, just below trend - see Figure 
6. Over the whole period recovery continues to be weaker in 
Scotland than the UK. 
 
Employment Forecasts 
Table 3 presents our forecasts for net employee jobs for the 
4 years 2010 to 2013 on the 3 scenarios. 
 
Table 3 indicates that our year-end employee jobs forecast 
for 2010 has again been significantly revised. As noted 
above there was a considerable shake-out of jobs at the end 
of 2009 and so this appears to have resulted in firms moving 
more quickly to hire new workers as the economy started to 
recover, with attendant effects on unemployment  than was 
the case in the UK. Net jobs grow by 0.9% in 2010, 0.9% in 
2011, 1.4% in 2012 and 1.7% in 2010. By 2013 total 
employee jobs are forecast to be around 60,000 fewer than 
Table 3: Forecast Scottish Net Jobs Growth in Three Scenarios, 2010-2013 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
High growth 
      
 22,267 
       
42,626 
 
51,025 
 
 
November forecast -7,000 42,300 50,404 n.a. 
Central 20,113 19,780 31,741 39,808 
November forecast  -12,794 21,224 39,124 n.a. 
Low growth 18,357 5,895 11,586 19,256 
November forecast -22,700 4,400 21,100 n.a 
 
 
 
Table 4: ILO unemployment rate and claimant count rate measures of unemployment under each of the three forecast 
scenarios 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 
ILO unemployment rate  
High growth 7.9% 7.8% 6.6%     5.4% 
Central 8.0% 8.8% 8.4% 7.9% 
Numbers 215,000 234,072 224,945 212,657 
Low growth 8.1% 9.4% 9.8% 10.1% 
Claimant count rate  
High growth 4.8% 4.7% 4.0% 3.2% 
Central 4.9% 5.3% 5.0% 4.7% 
Numbers 138,300 150,849 144,967 137,048 
Low growth 4.9% 5.7% 5.9% 6.1% 
 
 
in 2007 and broadly the same as at the end of 2004. By 
sector, the main source of job creation is in the service 
sector from 2011 with net job gains between 2010 and 2013 
of 75,000 on 2009 levels. The production sector loses 
23,000 jobs in 2010 but gains more than 26,000 jobs 
between 2011 and 2013. Jobs are also created in 
construction, nearly 24,000 in 2010 and then a slower rate 
of increase between 2011 and 2013 as nearly 4,000 further 
jobs are added. 
 
Unemployment Forecasts 
The key unemployment forecasts are summarised in Table 
4. 
 
The ILO rate is our preferred measure since it identifies 
those workers who are out of a job and are looking for work, 
whereas the claimant count simply records the unemployed 
who are in receipt of unemployment benefit. We noted in the 
discussion above of labour market performance during the 
recession and recently that output change will only pass 
through to unemployment and activity rate change if firms 
are not labour hoarding. The degree of labour hoarding may 
be less in Scottish firms for the reasons noted above and so 
the recovery to date has had a bigger effect on 
unemployment in Scotland than in the UK. But the Scottish 
GDP recovery will continue to be weaker and at a rate 
below that which is required - from the estimated Okun 
relationship - to stabilise unemployment. We therefore 
expect that unemployment will start to pick up again in 
Scotland this year reaching 8.8%, or 234,000 by the end of 
the year. After that, though, the recovery should be 
sufficiently strong to make some dent in the rate and so we 
are forecasting lower rates of 8.4% and 7.9% in 2012 and 
2013 respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
25 February 2011 
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